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reconimenids  new ways to think about whiat  actions will be most
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References  36ON HUNGER  AND PUBLIC ACTION
Martin  . ivallion
Our  understanding  of what causes  hunger  has  come a long  way in the  past
ten  years  or so.  Progress  has also  been  made in  understanding  how  public
action  can  help  fight  hunger,  and  there  are  reasons  for  qualified  optimism
about  future  prospects  in doing  so.  The  recent  publication  of Hunger  and
Public  Action  by Jean  Dreze  and  Amartya  Sen  makes  this a good  time  to take
stock  of some  of the  lessons  learnt,  and  of some  of the things  we still  need
to know more  about. 1 That  is the  purpose  of this  article.
The  Dreze  and  Sen  book is a good  starting  point  for  a  discussion  of
anti-hunger  policy. While  making  an outstanding  contribution  to the
literature,  it is also  an accessible  book,  written  with clarity  of thought,
and economy  of technique. But it is  more  than a  book about  specific  policies;
it is also  an applied  study  in aspects  of  the theory  of policy. It  not  only
prescribes  things  to do, it  also  prescribes  a  way  to think  about  what we
should  do.  New concepts  are  advocated  for  that  task.  This article  will try
to critically  evaluate  the  arguments  of Huncer  and  Public  Action  (hereafter
HPA) in  the light  of recent  literature  and  experience,  with  the aim  of
assessing  implications  for  both  policy,  and  the  way we think  about  policy.
HPA is  certainly  a scholarly  book,  but it is one  with  a clear  and
potentially  influential  prescriptive  message. I found  myself  in sympathy  with
that  message. And I  believe  it is  one around  which  a reasonably  broad
consensus  could  now  be formed  in  the  development  community,  particularly  in
1the light of tc  not dissimilar views found in the other major works on this
topic to emerge in the last year or so, most notably the UNDP's Human
Development Renort, and the World Bank's 1990 World Development Reoort (UNDP,
1990; World Bank, 1990).  However, I  did feel uncomfortable at times with the
emphasis given to certain aspects of HPA's message, and with some of the data
and methods used to support it.  These are not issues tnat can be easily
resolved, though they are important.  This article will also try to identify
points where further research on anti-hunger polx,y seems called for.
Part 1 of HPA deals with the concepts used, and surveys some evidence on
relevant magnitudes.  Part 2 deals with famine prevention, while Part 3 looks
at the longer term issucs of anti-hunger policy.  I shall broadly follow the
same structure.  After summarizing the key concepts in HPA, I shall offer a
critical assessment of the differences between this book's approach and more
familiar alternatives.  I shall also make a few observations about the
limitations of the data and methods used in HPA.  I will then turn to the
substantive policy issues raised in HPA, concerning (first) famine prevention
and relief, and (second) anti-hunger policy in the longer term.  Here I shall
try to evaluate the arguments made, and elaborate on some key issues.  Before
concluding, I shall offer a few observations on the implications for
international development assistance.
1  Concepts
I shall first summarize the main concepts used in HPA.  The next section
will offer a critical comparison with some more familiar ideas.
Let us begin with the concepts in the book's title.  The definition of
"hunger" in HPA is broad in that it embraces all kinds of biological and
2social  disadvantages  which  may be ausociated  with inadequate  food  intekes.
Thus,  for  ouample,  adaptation  to low  food  energy  intakes  by lowering  activity
levels  may not leave  a  person ,hungry",  by his  or her own  assessments. sen
and  Dreze  would,  nonetheless,  deem  this  to be a food  related  deprivation
within  the scope  of their  study  - in short,  a problem  of hunger. Also  the  HPA
concept  of "public  action"  embraces  non-governmental  actions  in  a public
domain,  and so involves  a lot  more  than "public  policy",  in  the usual  sense.
For  example,  the  voluntary  provision  of relief  against  hunger  in  a community  -
the so-called  "moral  economy"  in some  anthropological  literature  -
constitutes  "public  action"  in  HPA.
The  book's  policy  analysis  is  grounded  in  the concepts  of "entitlement",
"functioning"  and "capability",  drawn  from  Amartya  Sen's  work at the interface
of welfare  economics  and  moral  philosophy  (see,  for  example,  Sen 1984,  Chapter
13; 19851  1989a). Thus,  HPA is  not  only  of interest  for  what it says  to do
about  policy;  it is also  of interest  as an application  of these  concepts  to
policy  issues.
The concept  of entitlement  is  used  throughout  this book,  following  Sen
(1981a). A person's  entitlements  over  some  time  period  are  the various
consumption  bundles  that  are legally  attainable  from  that  person's  initial
endowm.4nts,  given  prevailing  prices. HPA also  refers  to "extended
entitlements",  being  the  extra  command  over  goods  allowed  by implicit
contracts  or social  customs  which,  though  they create  claims  over  consumption,
are  not legally  enforceable.
A theme  of HPA is that  entitlements  should  not  be viewed  as the final
objective  of human  well-being. Rather  it is  the  capabilitv  for  doing  valued
things  (called  functioninas)  that  ultimately  matters:  "Formally,  a person's
3capabLiLty  is a aet  of functionlng  bundles,  representing  the  varioua  'boings
and  doLngs'  that a  person  can  achieve  wlth  his  or her  economic,  soclal,  and
person,'l  charact:,istlcs"  (HPA,  p.12,  footnote  18).  Furthermore,  the  authors
argue  that  the  goal of public  actlon  should  be to expand  human  capabillties,
rather  than entltlements  per so.
The specLfic  capabllity  of most Lmportarce  to the  topic  of HPA io that
of belng  alive  and  healthy. Being  adequately  nourlshed  io seen  as essential
for  this  capability. Here the  authors  also  take a  broad  view,  in which
variability  ln  nutrient  needs  for  good  health  i9  emphaiLzed,  as li the
importance  of complementary  inputs  such  as health  care,  baseic  education,  clean
drLnking  water,  and  adequate  sanitation.
One (more  familiar)  concept  is  conspicuous  for  lts  absence  from  HPA,
namely  "food  security". Earlier  inconsistencies  in  the  usage  of this  term
have largely  vanished;  food  security  ia  now  widely  deflned  as "..access  by all
people  at all  times  to enough  food  for  an active  and  Ahealthy  life"  (World
Bank,  1986,  p.1).  Dreze  and  Sen  are  careful  about  wuords,  and I amJ  sure  they
have  their  reasons  for  avoldlng  this  term.  I expect  they  view it  as giving
undue  emphasis  to command  over  goods,  and just  one  bundle  of goods,  food.
Nonetheless,  much  of HPA is  unquestionably  about  attaining  food  security,  and
there  is clearly  a  broad  consensus  on substance  with other  recent  writings  on
food  security,  including  the Bank's policy paper on  the topic (World Bank,
1986).
2  How  a  thia  approach  different?
The  concept  of "hunger"  found  in research  and  policy  is sometimes  far
more narrow  than  that used  by Dreze  and  Sen.  I  believe  their  broader
4perspective  is warranted. A person  who  adapts  to iow  food  energy  intake
through  diminished  activity  leveis  (r-ecalling  the  aforementioned  example)  is
someone  who one  would  want to help  through  anti-hunger  policies. Yet some
approaches  found  in  both research  and  practice  would (.  t  least  implicitly)
dictate  otherwise. For  example,  the  use  of child  anthropometric  measures
(such  as weight-for-age)  to indicate  nutritional  need is suspect  from  this
point  of view. (It  has  been found  that  seemingly  satisfactory  physical  growth
rates  on children  are  maintained  at low  food  energy  intake  levels  by not
playing; see Beaton's 1983 survey.  That is surely  a  serious food related
deprivation  for  any child.)
The broader  concept  of hunger  used  by Dreze  and  Sen is  motivated  by the
above  ideas  of "functioning"  and  "capability".  This  approach  will  be novel  to
many  present  day  economists,  and  others  (though  it does  have  roots  in
classical  political  economy,  and,  indeed,  Aristotle's  views  on "political
distribution";  see  Sen, 1989a). Thus  it  might  be considered  a significant
departure  from  present-day  "mainstream"  approaches  to the  welfare  economics  of
public  policy.  Is it?
Dreze  and  Sen  emphasize  the inadequacies  of viewing  c  -wsption  of
commodities  as an end in itself  (also  a prominent  theme  of the  Human
Development  ReDort). However,  I  do not  think  that  the real  difference  lies
here,  at least  in theory. The  current  mainstream  approach  in economi-  theory,
which is  clearly  seen  by the  authors  as a good  deal less  than adequate  for  the
task  at hand,  does not insist  that income,  or command  over consumption,  is the
final  objective  of personal  well-being. Nor  does it insist  that income  is all
that  matters  in  determining  individual  well-being,  or that  personal
characteristics  do not  matter,  at given  consumption  levels. By either
5approach,  we can  conceive  of well-being  depending  on the  same  basic
ingredients:  goods  consumed,  the  time spent  in variouL  activities,  and
personal  characteristics.
Nor  does  the capabilities  approach  allow  us to avoid  making  value
judgments  in  welfare  assessments. Which  capabilities  do we deem  relevant?
How  do we deal  with  trade-offs,  both  between  different  capabilities  of the
same  person,  and  the capabilities  of different  persons? Both  approaches
recognize  that the  valuation  of individual  "welfare",  including  the  position
one  takes  in aggregating  gains  and  losses  to different  individuals,  is
fundamentally  an  ethical  judgement.  (Sen,  along  with Kenneth  Arrow  and  others,
has  been  a prominent  exponent  of that  view in  more  mainstream  literature.)
However,  an important  difference  can  emerge  in  the oractice  of policy
analysis. The  capabilities  approach  forces  us to take  a quite  broad
perspective  on the  range  of factors  considered  relevant  to individual  well-
being. By its  somewhat  more  eclectic  nature,  the  mainstream  approach  to the
theory  of policy  more readily  allows  certain  special  assumptions  to be made in
applications.  These  are  assumptions  about  those  determinants  of individual
welfare  which  are  difficult  to observe. An example  is the  assumption  that
some suitably  normalized  measure  of income  or consumption  is an adequate
indicator  of individual  well-being,  i.e.,  that individuals  are  identical  in
all  other  respects. This  is a common  assumption  to make in conventional
applied  welfare  analysis. I doubt  if it  would  ever  be easily  accepted  when
applying  the capabilities  approach.
This  may or may  not  matter;  in some  circumstances  it can  be quite
innocuous  to ignore  non-income  differences  across  individuals. But in  other
circumstances  it could  make a big  difference  to the  conclusions  ora  draws
6about  pollcies. For  example,  social  sector  policies  have sometimes  been
judged  solely  according  to  what they  do for  productivity  and,  hence,  incomes.
Even if one  conflned  attention  to that  most  basic  of capabilities  - to be
healthy  - one  would  not  take  such  a narrow  point  of view.
One  potentially  important  difference  does  exist  at a  more theotetical
level. There  is a profound  difference  between  the  concept  of "capability",  in
which  objective  "functionings"  are  the  things  whic.i  are seen  to give  well-
being  to a purson,  aad  the  classical  idea  of "utility",  in  which  subjective
assessments  of "happiness"  or "satisfaction"  serve  that role. The latter  need
not reflect  many real  deprivationes  an undernourished  person  may  well be quite
happy,  but  one could  hardly  say  that  she is  not  then  deprived. Sen  and  others
have  been critical  of utility  based  welfare  analyses  for  this  reason.
However,  this argument  carries  less  weight  in application. Since  we
cannot  (in  general)  derive  sufficiently  clear  social  welfare  assessments  of
policy  changes  solely  from  information  on individual  preferences,  there  is
ample  scope  in  practice  for  other  information  when  making  inter-personal
comparisons  of well-being. "U'ility  functions"  are  a legitimate  matter  for
ethical  4udgement  in  applied  work.  The  practical  problems  of  observing
preferences  can  also  lead  to  the  incorporation  of  non-behavioral  information
in  applied  welfare  analysis. (Individual  preferences  over  market  goods  can
often  be deduced  from  demand  behavior,  zhough  measurement  problems  abound;
this doee  not, however,  tell  us much  about  how  to value  non-market  goods,  such
as a  parent's  satisfaction  from  having  children,  or public  goods.) Ideas  on
"endogenous  preferences"  (in  which  we see  preferences  as determined  within  the
economy,  rather  than outside  it)  and "merit  goods"  (in  which  we may judge  that
7a  policy  matters  even if no individual's  utility  is  affected)  are also  found
in the current  maingtream  approaches,  albeit  at the  periphery.
Another  difference  between  HPA and  some  other  vLews  is  evident  Ln  the
importance  Dreze  and  Sen  attach  to human  resource  development  through  the
public  provision  of social  services, There  is  an emerging  consensus  in  recent
literature  that human  resource  development,  through  improved  nutrition,
health,  and  basic  education,  must be given  a  higher  priority  than in  the past;
see, for  example,  World  Bank (1989,  1990),  and  UNDP (1990). There  4q  less
sign  of consensus  on two  further  questions,  both  of which  reist  be resolved  if
we are  to act successfully  in  this itr.-  tant  area  -f social  polic:
i)  What  weight  should  be attached  to investme.at  in  human  resources
versus  current  consumption,  and  other  forms  of investment? While  one  may
agree  that  human  resource  development  hai  been neglected,  the  optimal  level  of
investment  is  unclear.
ii)  What is the  relative  importance  of private  versus  public  provision
as instruments  for  achieving  human  resource  development? Many  of the  inputs
to developing  and  maintaining  human  resources  arc  essentially  private  goods
(in  that the  benefits  are  exclusive  to the individual  consumer),  and  so there
is a possibility  for  efficient  provision  through  markets. Human  resource
development  will then  require  that  people  want  and can  afford  these  goods.
The case  for  direct  public  provision  then  depends  on the  adequacy  of policy
instruments  influencing  incomes  and  their  distribution,  or on the  existence  of
relevant  market  failures.  (For  example,  some  :jredients  of basic  health  care
do have  the  properties  of public  goods,  leading  to under-provision  by m.vkets.
There  may also  be economies  of scale  in  public  provision.)
8On both issues, HPA advocates that the expaneion of human capabilities
should be the sole criterion in making policy choices.  Clearly this tends to
put a high weight on human resource development; indeed the latter can be
defined so broadly that it is not obvious that anything else would matter.  It
also has inplications for t.ae  mode of provision.  Here HPA emphasize success
in supplying social services through public provision, relative to success in
expanding private incomes, as alternative instruments for human resource
deselopment.  The role of food entitlements in famine relief is not questioned
in HPA, but relatively less attention is given to the role of entitlements
over goods in reducing chronic (rather  than transitory) hunger.
The proper balance between public and private provisioning is a long-
standing and difficult issue.  HPA bases its prescriptions solely on the
implications for human capabilities.  Some we)l-known arguments against public
provision of private goods do not then arise in any obvious way, such as the
concerrn  with the welfare losses from imposing a common level of public
provision when tastes vary.  Within the capabilities approach, the case for
public provision rests heavily on the strength of the relationship between
capabilities and incomes.  In the case of nutritional capabilities, if there
is only a weak link between '-income  poverty" and "hunger", relative to other
factors, then Dreze and Sen are justified in putting less emphasis on incomes
in reducing hunger (except in so far as growth facilitates the financing of
public support, a role to which HPA does attach some importance, as will be
discussed later).
There has been some debate about the relationship between income poverty
and hunger in the past few years.  A great deal of effort has gone into the
queetion of how responsive nutrient intakes - particularly food energy intakes
9- are to changes in income.  Recent econometric estimates using household
level data have suggested that food energy intakes are relatively unresponsive
to income changes, even for the poor. (For a good ourvey see Behrman 1990).
While I agree that some past estimates have over-stated the income response of
individual intakes. it should not be inferred that the capability of being
adequately nourished for good health is also unresponsive to income changes.
This will depend or.  how changes in intakes are reflected in nutritional
attainments, which will depend in turn on the severity of nutrient short-
falls relative .o needs, as well as other things such as health status.  These
factors can easily interact in a way that strengthens the link between income
poverty and "hunger" (broadly  defined, as in HPA).  For example, reasonable
measures of undernutrition in Indonesia have been found to respond quite
strongly to income gains, even though intakes at the individual level are
relatively unresponsive to incomes (Ravallion, 1990).  In this case, a
"capabilities" perspective suggests that incomes may matter more than was
otherwise thought, not less.
3  Data  and  methods
The methods of empirical analysis in HPA are also distinctive, though
here it is not so much for their sophistication as their lack of it.  Dreze
and Sen seem particularly shy of econometric methods.  Possibly they were
concerned about the book's accessibility to readers unfamiliar with these
methods.  But surely that is determined more by the way results are presented
than by the methods used to obtain them.  Nonotheless, as someone who uses
econometric methods routinely, I  must say I was impressed by how far the
10authors  seem  to be able  to take  us  with little  more than  the investigative
tool.  of 100  years  ago.
One example  should  suffice. HPA  presents  some  devastatingly  simple
estimates  of the  number  of "missing  women"  in the  world  due  to the  gender  biau
in  mortality. While  there  are  1,050  femptles  to every  1000  males  in  Europe  and
1,022  in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  the  figure  is as low  as 941,  931  and 905  in
China,  India  and  Pakistan,  representing  44  million,  37 million,  and 5  million
missing  women,  respectively,  when judged  against  the  African  ratio  of famales
to males.  Dreze  and  Sen attribute  tbh.s  to higher  rates  of female  mortality,
which  is  taken  to reflect  sex  bias in feeding  and  health  care.  They  note  that
these  figures  are  unlikely  to reflect  differences  in birth  rates  by gender,
though  they do not  discuss  other  possible  explanations. (I  can suggest  one:
The same  factors  that lead  to such  biases  would  presumably  also  yield  some
under-reporting  of females  in  the household  census.) Nonetheless  these
unsophisticated  figures  provide  an alarming  indication  of the  possible
magnitude  of the problem  of gender  bias in  parts  of the developing  world.
But this  sort  of empirical  analysis  can  only  take  us  so  far.  There  is  a
great  deal  of data  with bearing  on this  and  other  questions  raised  in  HPA
which  has  not  been exploited  there.  I suspect  that  at least  part of the
reason  is  that  the  more sophisticated  methods  needed  to learn  from  such  data
have  been shunned. I  notice,  for  example,  that  hardly  a scrap  of household-
level  data  on living  standards  has  been  used,  despite  the fact  that  many  of
the countries  mentioned  in  this  book  now  have  such  data,  and  most of them  are
readily  available,  and  often  for  more than  one  point  in  time.  And these  are
data  with quite  direct  bearing  on capability  assessments  (as  well as  more
conventional  welfare  measures). The  attainment  of a variety  of basic
11capabilities and functionings can be assessed from a good household survey of
llving standards.  Certain, now quite familiar, poverty measures can be
interpreted this way: in the abstract, their objective is to assess the extent
of some need fulfillment.  (Elsewhere Sen hae argued compellingly, in my view,
that "poverty" should be viewed as "lack of capability"; see Sen 1984, Chapter
12, and 1987.)  Here Dreze and Sen may reasonably question the sole use of the
conventional consumption expenditure indicator of well-being in poverty
measurement.  But then we need not be confined to that particular indicator,
and there are now many household surveys that allow other possibilities.  Some
of these surveys have also tracked the same households over two or more years,
and can thus be used to help quantify the distinction made by Dreze and Sen
(and  others) between "chronic" and "transitory" poverty or hunger (Ravallion,
1988).
In discussing progress in reducing chronic hunger in Part 3 of HPA,
Dreze and Sen rely almost exclusively on a few "social indicators", such as
aggregate child mortality and average life expectancy.  I found this
surprising.  These indicators are useful up to a point, but it must be
recognized that they can be rather uninformative about the quality of the
lives that people live - their capabilities, if you wish.  One could hardly
contend that they are good indicators of the attainment of the most basic
capabilities, beyond being alive.  In making comparisons over time, they may
also be deceptively sensitive to even a limited degree of progress in primary
health care, particularly when starting from a high mortality rate.  While
preventing the common infectious and parasitic diseases such as malaria is
undeniable progress, there is a lot mora to the elimination of chronic hunger
and related deprivations.  Furthermore, though these indicators are probably
12influenced by the distribution of welfare, their usefulness as indicators of
distribution is quite unclear.  For example, they may not be as responsive to
the well-being of the ultra-poor as we would like.  And the low participation
of this group in many policies ostensibly designed to help them (including
some applauded in HPA) has been of serious concern (Lipton, 1983; Jimmenez,
1935, Chapter 5; World Bank, 1990, Chapter 5).
Real progress - or lack of it - in reducing the persistent.  poverty
underlying chronic hunger may show up little in these aggregate social
indicators.  Data inadequacies are not now a good enough justification; for
example, there is a marked contrast between HPA and the broad set of measures
of the well-being of the poor assembled in various chapters of the recent
World Development Report (WDR) on poverty (World Bank, 1990).  Well designed
household based surveys have proved to be a potentially powerful tool for
studying many of the dimensions of well-being discussed in HPA, such as access
to social services, as well as command over private consumption goods.
4  Famines
A large part of HPA is devoted to policies for preventing famine,
building on Jean Dreze's recent work (particularly  Dreze 1990 a,b), as well as
Amartya Sen's well-known earlier writings, particularly Sen (1981a).  The
latter book made an enormous contribution in exposing the limitations of the
simple-minded view that famines are caused by a decline in aggregate food
availability.  The  main information gathered by researchers attempting to
understand the causes of a particular famine, or to anticipate future famines,
has usually concerned aggregate food availability.  Indeed, this has sometimes
been the only information deemed necessary.  Sen (1981a) has argued that this
13approach  has little  analytical  force  in  understanding  some  major famines  of
this  century. Many  of these  were not  associated  with an  obvious  food
availability  decline. But  even for  those  famines  that  may have  been,  the
arithmetic  of aggregate  food  statistics  does not  explain  why similar
shortfalls  at other  times  or places  did  not also  result  in famines. Nor does
it help  us understand  the incidence  of famine  mortality  within  a population.
Instead,  Sen  advocates  study  of the  entitlements  of famine  victims. of
course,  people  may avoid  or suffer  starvation  without  a change  in  their
entitlements;  they  may avoid  it by illegal  means  or suffer  it by choice. But
it is claimed  that  by focusing  on the  determinants  of individual  budgets,  the
entitlements  approach  is useful  in understanding  how specific  famines  happen,
and how  they  may  be avoided. This  perspective  has  clear  antecedents  in the
literature  on famines  in India  (see,  for  example,  Bhatia,  1967,  though
recognition  of the importance  of entitlements  probably  goes  back  centuries  in
the subcontinent  and  elsewhere). Sen  has  contributed  greatly  in focusing
analysis  and  policy  on the  role  of entitlements  in the  causation  and  relief  of
modern  famines. Some  critics  since  Sen's  work  on this topic  first  appeared
have  taught  us another  valuable  lesson,  that  even  the  clarity  of Sen's  writing
is amenable  to serious  misinterpretation,  and  so Dreze  and  Sen  offer  some
further  clarification.
But  the  primary  goal  of HPA  is to show  how  famine  can  be prevented  by
public  action. A wide  range  of such  action  is  discussed,  generally  focused  on
the  key issue:  how  to avoid  the  contractions  in entitlements  suffered  by
vulnerable  groups. This is  not just  a matter  of avoiding  transient  distress,
though  that is ample  motivation. Longer  term  chronic  hunger  is both  a cause
and  effect  of suffering  during  a famine. Protecting  the  entitlements  of the
14poor  at such  times  can  have  an important  long-term  role ln  development  (both
ln the  excessively  narrow  sense  of "economlc  growth",  and  the  richer  sense  of
expanded  human  capabilities).  Dreze  and Sen  help  further  expose  the
dubiousness  of classlfylng  publlc  actLons  ln  thli context  lnto  mutually
exclueive  categorLes  of wreliefP  and "development".
4.1  Markets  and  faamines
The first  step in  formulatlng  sound  pollcies  is  to understand  how
existing  allocatlve  instltutLons  work,  of which  markets  are  generally  the  most
important.  While  the  crucial  response  of  markets  to  lmpending  famlne,  and  the
role  of  publlc  action,  is  given  adequate  attentlon  ln  HPA,  I  shall  elaborate  a
little  on some  of the Lisues  here,  and  discuss  some  points  whlch  are  not
particularly  well covered  ln the  book.  The  main  pollcy  issues  that arise
concern  both  the spatial  and  intertemporal  performance  of food-graln  markets.
There  can  be no  presumption  that  spatlal  food  movements  through  private
trade  will alleviate  a famLne;  the  food  will  probably  move  accordlng  to market
prices  which  need  not  be hlgher  in the  worst-off  regions  (sufficLent  to cover
transport  costs). Following  Sen (1981a),  HPA  points  to the fact  that  there
have  been  examples  of food  export  from  famine  affected  reglons. Thls is
termed  a "slump  famLne",  to indlcate  how  the phenomenon  depends  on purchasLng
power  contractions  ln  affected  reglons.
However,  there  is a risk  of some  confuslon  here.  The  existence  of food
export  during  a famine  does  not  mean  that  external  trade  has  not  helped
stabillze  domestlc  consumption. The  crucial  question  is  whether  food  exports
decllned  durlng  the famine  (or  imports  increased).  This  begs two  further
questLons: Dld foodgrain  exports  respond  to changes  ln relative  prices? Dld
15the relative prices facing traders reflect domestic scarcities?  HPA does not
address these questions.  The evidence on at least one supposed case of "slump
famine" does not support the view that trade was consumption de-stabillzing
(namely the famines in British India  around the turn of this century; see
Rava...ion,  1987a).  Equally well, there can be no presumption that
governmental restrictions on food movements will improve matters, and there is
evidence that they have not (Ravallion, 1987b).  A better approach, well
advocated in HPA, is to raise food purchasing power of the poor in affected
regions.
Nor should it be presumed that the inter-temooral allocation of food
availability achieved by markets during a famine will be ideal.  Popular
opinion would have it that markets work badly in this regard during famines,
with current scarcities exacerbated by panic buying and excessive hoarding.
Some experts have agreed (for  example, a well-known handbook on famine and
disaster relief recommends various actions against food hoarding; see
Nasefield, 1967).  The very existence of private food stocks during famine has
often raised considerable anxiety, not least amongst those threatened with
starvation.
However, this assessment fails to appreciate the potentially important
role of storage as a means of stabilizing consumption over time - a  role which
;nay  well be desirable from the point of view of the survival chances of the
poor as well as the profits of speculative traders.  Whether markets work well
in this regard will depend on how competitive they are and how well traders
have anticipated future scarcity.
There is evidence of very harmful destabilizing speculation in one major
famine, that in Bangladesh in 1974.  Traders' price forecasting errors appear
16to have been positively correlated with readily available information on
damage to the future harvest (Ravallion, 1987b).  Thus, rice hoarding prior to
anticipated production losses was excessive when compared to the likely
outcome with efficient markets.  Rice prices rose to record levels in the
months between the flooding and the arrival of the next (depleted) harvest and
prices fell sharply in the week or two preceding the arrival of that harvest.
The severe contraction in the food entitlements of the poor led to a sharp
increase in mortality, which also peaked before the decline in aggregate food
availability (Ravallion, 1987b).
The evidence on the Bangladesh famine also raises doubts about the
performance of non-market food institutions.  Rice prices in Bangladesh are
influenced by changes in the government's foodgrain stock, itself determined
by previous imports (including foreign aid) and internal procurement efforts.
Thus, traders' expectations of the effect of pre-harvest crop damage on future
prices require an assumption about the government's response to shared
information.  The most plausible conclusion is that the stockholders' over-
optimistic price expectations and/or anticipations of future rationing during
the 1974 famine were premised on a belief that the government would be unable
to implement a suitable stabilizing response to the reported damage to the
future crop.
Here a positive role for government is not to ban grain "hoarding".
This is unlikely to work (it is not difficult to effectively hide stocks), and
may even make matters worse by fuelling excessive price expectations, premised
on a lack of confidence in the government's credibility.  Rather, public
action should be geared to supporting public confidence in future food
availability and the stability of prices, through open market operations and
17food  distribution  policies,  backed  up by adequate  stocks  and/or  stabilizing
external  food  trade  or aid  policies. By such  means,  Bangladesh  has  done a
better  job  of avoiding  famine  in  the 19809  (osmani,  198',
4.2  "Cash" versus "food"
Direct  food  delivery  to potential  famine  victims  is  the  most common
policy  instrument  for  famine  relief. This  has  two  distinct  functions:  i)
raising  aggregate  food  availability,  and ii)  raising  the food  entitlements  of
vulnerable  groups. Dreze  and  Sen  argue  that  there  is a  potential  gain from
separating  these  two functions. Selling  food  aid  or imports  in domestic
markets  and  using  the  proceeds  to reach  the  need-  may  be more effective  than
direct  food  delivery. Cash  transfers  can  also  help  even if aggregate  food
availability  cannot  be increased;  for  example,  the  authors  point  to the
success  of the  Government  of  Maharashtra  in India  in avoiding  famine  in 1972-
73  using  a rural  public  employment  scheme,  even  when  food supply  could  not  be
rapidly  increased.
There  has  been  recent  debate  within  and  amongst  some  of the
international  agencies  about  the  merits  of monetizing  food  aid.  It is  not an
issue  around  which  one could  say  there  is  much current  agreement  in the
development  community. (For  discussions  of the  various  views  held  on the
subject  see  Reutlinger,  1984,  Berg,  1987,  and  Singer  et al.,  1987.) I found
Dreze  and  Sen  quite  convincing  on this issue. The  important  point  here  ie
that  there  can  be no presumption  that the  usual  policy  of direct  food  delivery
cannot  be improved  upon  with  given  resources. The choice  between  cash  and
food  relief  must be judged  by efficacy  in  helping  those  in need,  and  that  will
18depend on the specific setting, including the performance of food-grain
markets.
Under competitive conditions, the case in favor of cash relief is strong
if either food prices in the affected region are below wo-ld prices at the
border (since, of course, recipients will then be able to purchase more food
locally with the cash aid than the aid agency can obtain with the same money
on world markets) or if private traders can deliver the food more efficiently
than the aid agency.  The case in favor of cash relief is less obvious if
local markets perform poorly, alti.ough  even then the policy switch may be
preferable under some conditions; for example, cash relief can result in lower
mortality than direct food aid even if the local food trade is monopolized,
provided that (amongst other conditions) traders can still deliver food at
lower cost than the aid agency (Coate,  1989).
A common argument against monetization of food aid is that donors are
prone to be more generous when they know that their aid is given in the form
of food.  Dreze and Sen pay little attention to this argument, though I am
unsure how much attention it merits.  This case for food (rather  than cash)
relief clearly depends on the motives of donors.  If they are concerned to
save lives, then they should judge the issue in the same fashion as Dreze and
Sen; an unconditional preference for the commodity form of aid could only
reflect misinformation.  The case is less clear if donors have some other
objective.
Another common objection to cash relief is that it will lead to higher
food prices.  Dreze and Sen argue that this is fine provided that the higher
food prices are the result of an effectively targeted cash transfer policy;
those in need will still be better off.  One could quarrel with the
19theoretical generality of their argument here, as we are  ertainly not talking
about conditions which rule out the possibility that initial gains to the
recipient are substantially eroded by subsequent changes in relative prices
(Ravallion, 1987b).
But focusing on that debate would risk missing the main point of HPA,
which is to stimulate a more creative approach to policy formulation, and
careful consideration of the relative merits of the policy options.  As
elsewhere in HPA, Dreze and Sen demonstrate that greater clarity of thought in
distinguishing "ends" from "means" can enhance the prospects for effective
public action against hunger.
4.3  Reaching  the  vulnerable
Whether in the form of cash or food, if transfers are to be effective in
famine prevention or relief then they will have to be genuinely
redistributive.  The advantages of a well targeted transfer scheme are plain
enough, though it should not be presumed that those advantages can be realized
at little cost to the poor.  Without the necessary administrative
capabilities, targeting is not easy.  For example, as Dreze and Sen point out,
the underlying intra-household allocation of food will often adjust to
countervail attempts to target certain individuals through  supplementary
feeding programs.  The goal must be to protect the household entitlements of
vulnerable individuals.
Amongst the alternative targeting mechanisms, Dreze and Sen argue for a
combination of employment provision, whereby relief is given to those willing
to work at low wages, and unconditional relief to those who are obviously
unemployable.  Direct employment provision as an element of a comprehensive
20"safety not" for the poor also gets  favorable reviews in other recent
literature (see for example ILO, l988, World Bank, 1990, Chapter 6, and UNDP,
1990).  Some  other  discussions have been  somewhat less enthusiastic (s0e, for
example, World Bank, 1986).
Rural public works schemes have proved repeatedly in South Asia and in
recent times in parts of Africa and Latin America that they are one of the few
effective policy instruments available for reaching the able-bodied rural poor
in times of need.  The largest and most established relief work scheme is
undoubtedly the "Employment Guarantee Scheme" run by the Indian state of
Maharashtra since the mid-1970s, which developed out of the aforementioned
successful famine relief efforts of that state in the early 1970s.  This
scheme aims to offer unskilled employment on rural infrastructure projects on
demand, at wage rates on a par with going wages in agriculture.  From the
point of view of this discussion, the striking feature of the scheme is how
responsive it is to good and bad agricultural seasons.  The monthly attendance
can easily vary by a factor of three within a year.  Attendances peak in the
dry summer period when there is little other work, and they vary from year to
year, according to the vagaries of the monsoon.  For example, severe monsoon
failures in Western India led to record attendances at the scheme's project
sites in 1987, and the employment provided was clearly instrumental in
avoiding food entitlement collapses and famine.
The reason relief work schemes seem to be so well targeted is that they
impose a cost (forgone income, transport cost, disutility of work) on would-
be participants which tends to be lowest for those in greatest need.  Critics
of these schemes have pointed out that this is a deadweight loss.  However, it
can still be well worth incurring, given the costs of the alternative forms of
21intervention.  We simply  do not  have  access  to the sorts  of policy  instruments
- such  an perfectly  targeted  lump-sum  transfers  - which  allow  costless
redistribution. In  any  case,  it is  very hard  to believe  that  the cost  of
participation  for  the  poor is high  at  times  when famine  throatens,  so that  the
net  transfer  is likely  to be a reasonably  high  proportion  of wage receipts.
But  we have  very little  idea  of just  how  high.  This is important  in  assessing
whether  or not  this is  the most  cost-effective  form  of relief. There  li also
much we do not  know about  the  second-round  effects  on other  sources  of income
(such  as agricultural  wages)  and  the risk  benefits.  (Ravallion,  1991,  surveys
evidence  on the  two largest  schemes  in South  Asia).  Nonetheless,  I think  we
do know  enough  to agree  with  Dreze  and  Sen  that direct  employment  provision  is
a potentially  important  policy  instrument  in  this context.
It  should  be emphasized  that  an aim  of this  type  of public  action  is  to
avoid  the  onset  of famine  by protecting  the  entitlements  of the vulnerable;
they need  not  already  be starving,  but they  can  see  the impending  risk. An
effective  system  of famine  relief  should  be ready  to go into  action  as soon  as
it is needed,  which  will  typically  be well  before  external  food  aid can
arrive. And it should  ideally  fall  out  of use  when it is not  needed. HPA
discusses  a number  of success  stories  in famine  prevention  through  such
domestic  public  action,  such  as  Maharashtra  in 1972-73,  and  Botswana  in 1982-
87.
While  saving  lives  is  the  over-riding  goal,  that  is not  the  only  reason
to favor  effective  entitlement  protection  through  public  action. Though  I
have  not  seen any  estimates,  it is  surely  plausible  that even  the  narrowly
defined  current  financial  costs  of an effective  system  of early  response  are
well  below  the  costs  of belated  famine  relief  and  rehabilitation.  A timely
22domestic policy response can also avoid the potentially disastrous
consequences to the poor of their more desperate later responses, such as
asset sales, and migration.  Though individually rational, these responses can
readily add-up to an snhanced collective risk of death, through exposure to
diaease, and leave those lucky enough to survive this time facing longer-term
destitution through a diminished asset base or greater indebtedness.  There is
an evident complementarity here between the provision of an effective safety
net for the poor and the long.r-term alleviation of poverty through economic
development.
5  Chronic  Hunger
It is one thing to prevent famine, and quite another to eliminate
chronic hunger.  The bulk of the discussion of the latter problem in HPA
focuses  on past country experiences in using direct policy intervention in
raising nutritional and related capabilities over the longer-term; the central
question addressed is whether direct intervention can work.
HPA examines in detail the experiences of a number of relatively
successful efforts at longer-term public support in developing countries, as
indicated by rates of improvement in social indicators, particularly under-
five mortality.  In characterizing these experiences, a distinction is made
between 'prowth-mediated security"  and "supDort-led security"; the former
relies on growth to finance public support, while the latter does not.
Expanding on earlier work by Sen (particularly 1981b), the authors show how
countries such as China, Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, Chile and Cuba have used
direct intervention in public provision to achieve the social indicators
typical of richer countries.  For example, Sri Lanka's life expectancy of
23about 70 years is higher than that of many countries with far higher average
incomes; in Brazil, for example, life expectancy is 65 years for a country
with roughly four times Sri Lanka's GNP per capita.
HPA's optimism on the scope for direct support-led security is shared by
many other recent writings on the subject, including World Bank (1986), FAQ
(1987), Berg (1987), UNDP (1990), Brown University Faculty (1990) and a series
of public declarations in recent years.2 There is a subtle but potentially
important difference of emphasis between these writings and the 1990  M
(World Bank, 1990).  In the latter document one finds a more qualified, but
still fairly positive, view of the prospects for certain sorts of direct
public support, particularly in the social sectors and in the provision of
income "safety nets".  However, in overall tone at least, the 1990 WDR clearly
sees direct support as less important instrument for poverty alleviation in
the longer-term than achieving the right sort of economic growth.
In identifying their success stories of support-led security, Dreze and
Sen look for large deviations below the line of best fit between under-five
mortality (on the vertical axis) and GNP per capita (horizontal axis).  This
approach follows Sen (1981b).  The aim is not to model mortality, but rather
to control for income variation in assessing performance.  The authors dwell
little on the fact that their results suggest that GNP per capita is generally
an excellent predictor of mortality; their concern is more with the cases
where it is a weak predictor, i.e., the "outliers".
Again, one can question the methods of investigation used here.  The
authors appear to have used an ordinary regression of mortality against GNP
per capita (both in logarithms) to find the outliers.  (The regression
equation is not given, nor is there a single summary statistic or diagnostic
24test.) This  particular  estimator  - which  minimizes  the sum  of squared
deviations  to find  the line  of best fit  - is  known  to be suspect  when  there
are  outliers;  in effect,  it  tries  "too  hard"  to accommodate  the  extremes.
From  the  plotted  data  points  in  HPA, I  would  be particularly  worried  about  the
effects  on these  estimates  of some  of the large  deviations  above  the  trend,
which  have  under-five  mortality  rates  as  much as five  times  higher  than  other
countries  at a similar  average  income  (Oman  is an example). The issue  here is
not  that  these  extreme  figures  are suspect,  but  rather  that  they  will have
undue  influence  on the  fitted  regression  equation. With  this rather  crude
estimation  method,  the quantitative  assessments  in HPA  of performance  relative
to income  are  queetionable. A  better  procedure  would  probably  have  been to
look  at the  residuals  around  a line  of best  fit  which  minimized  the absolute
deviations  (the  so-called  MAD  estimator).
The  Sen (1981b)  methodology  of looking  for  outliers  in a regression  of
social  indicators  against  mean income  has  been  criticized  in recent  literature
for  another  reason. Bhalla  and  Glewwe  (1986)  have  argued  that this  approach
fails  to control  adequately  for  "initial  conditions". They  re-examine  the
case  of Sri  Lanka,  which Isenman  (1981),  Sen (1981b),  and  HPA have  claimed  to
be an above  average  performer  in terms  of its  social  indicators,  given  the
country's  income  level. Bhalla  and  Glewwe  estimate  regressions  across
countries  of the  changes  in  various  social  indicators  from  1960  to 1978
against  changes  in  mean income  over  the same  period  (rather  than  having  both
variables  in levels  for  a single  date,  as in Sen,  1981b,  and  HPA).  In  the
process,  their  results  also suggest  that income  growth  is nogatively
correlated  with changes  in  the social  indicators  (though  they  comment  little
on this  particular  result). Using  these  regressions,  they find  that Sri  Lanka
25is  generally  h2LQN  the  regression  line,  not  above. They  conclude  that,  once
one  controls  for initial  conditions,  Sri  Lanka's  performance  is  unexceptional.
Single  cross-country  comparisons  can sometime-  be deceiving,  but  this
particular  criticism  of the  Sen  and  HPA  methodology  is hard  to accept  Ln  my
view.  Under  seemingly  plausible  assumptions  about  the  underlying  theoretical
model  determining  social  indicator  performance,  one can  show  that  the  Bhalla
and  Glewwe  results  (notably  that  Sri  Lanka  is below  their  regression  line  and
that the  line  is  downward  sloping)  are  entirely  consistent  with  the claims  of
Sen and  HPA (Ravallion,  1986). Furthermore,  Sri  Lanka's  excellent  social
indicators  at  the start  date for  the  Bhalla  and  Glewwe  study  can  be presumed
to also reflect  previous  levels  of public  support  (Sen,  1988,  1989b). It
would  clearly  be hazardous  to conclude  that  a low  rate  of improvement  after
that  date indicated  that  support-led  security  had failed. An analysis  of the
time-series  data  on various  social  indicators  (infant  mortality,  death  rate,
birth  rate)  for  Sri  Lanka  over  the  period  1952  to 1981  suggests  that  public
support,  particularly  through  outlays  on health,  has  been instrumental  in  the
observed improvement over time (Anand and Kanbur, 1990).
HPA  gives  a lot  of attention  to the interesting  comparison  of China  and
India,  in  terms  of their  performance  in public  support  over  the past  40 years
or so.  (Also  see  Sen  1989b.) The  relative  success  of China  in enhancing
longevity  (with,  the authors  argue,  similar  rates  of economic  growth),  is
contrasted  to the  greater  success  of India  in avoiding  famine  since  the 1950s.
While India  has  successfully  avoided  famine  through  effective  public
intervention  over this  period,  China  experiencpd  what  was arguably  the  worst
famine  in  recorded  history  in 1958-61;  the  estimates  of the excess  mortality
in  that famine  vary from  17 to 30  million  personsl The freer  press  and  more
26open political environment of India is cited as an important part of the
explanation for the differences in the success in avoiding famine, which is
far more newsworthy than chronic hunger.  I would expect that the anti-hunger
gains from these sorts of freedoms are highly conditional on a variety of
other factors in a given society, such as the existence of a sizable educated
middle class, as in India.  These other factors receive little attention in
HPA.  On the other hand, Dreze and Sen argue that China was able to raise
longevity through active intervention in health care and food distribution, at
least up to the late 1970s.  (There are also signs that the crisis in public
provision in the 1980s has eroded some of these gains, and during a period of
higher economic growth rates and falling incidence of income poverty,
particularly in rural areas.)
However, a number of questions are left begging by the treatment of
longer-term issues in HPA.  One which many readers will ask is: Can support-
led security can be achieved without undue sacrifice to a long-term expansion
in those capabilities which do require private consumption goods?  Some of the
economies which  have pursued support-led security over long periods, such as
Sri Lanka, have had less than impressive rates of economic growth.  One gets
the impression that Dreze and Sen do not see any necessary trade-off - that
support-led security need impinge little on future prospects for growth-
mediated security.  I believe that quite a credible argument to that effect
can be made, but it will not be found in HPA.  Whether a significant growth
cost is incurred in practice will depend on various conditions, notably the
structure of the economy (including any existing macroeconomic imbalances) and
the resource costs of intervention (which,  as Dreze and Sen do point out, may
be quite modest in poor countries, though little hard evidence is presented).
27By at least one assessment, the growth cost of direct poverty alleviation is
likely to be small provided that (and it is an important proviso) there are no
significant macroeconomic imbalances (Bourguignon, 1991).  HPA throws little
light on the prospects for a development strategy which combines support-led
security at an early stage with growth-mediated security in the longer-term.
It would be interesting to know if any of the countries identified in HPA as
examples of growth-mediated security would have been  examples of support-led
security at some earlier time when they were much poorer.
Related to this, a number of questions are left begging about the role
of public action in promoting equitable growth in private incomes - not as an
end in itself, I hasten to add, but as an instrument for higher ends
("increasing utility" or "expanding capabilities", as you prefer).  Very
little attention is given to the identified examples of growth-mediated
security (Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea).  I would expect that, with
the sustained periods of equitable growth experienced by these countries,
capabilities requiring private consumption goods have expanded greatly for the
poor, as have those requiring public provision.  There are numerous questions
about how public action can help here.  To give just one example, scant regard
is given in HPA to the policy issues which arise in achieving pro-poor
technical progress in agriculture.3
The fact that HPA throws little light on these questions is oddly
asymmetric with the earlier analysis of famines.  For example, the same basic
issues of cost-effectiveness, such as targeting versus uniformity, that HPA
covers quite adequately in the context of famine relief policy, also arise in
the formulation of longer-term social sector policies, but are hardly
mentioned in that context.
28Analogously  to the  HPA search  for  countries  with  good social  indicators
relative  to their  incomes,  it  would  be interesting  to also look  for  those  with
good social  indicators  relative  to their  levels  of public  expenditures  on
social  services. There  can  be no presumption  that simply  throwing  more  money
to the "social  sectors"  (health  and  education)  will go far  toward  expanding
the  capabilities  of the  poor;  indeed  in  many countries  a disproportionate
share  seems  to have  gone  to raising  the  capabilities  of those  with relatively
ample  capabilities  already  (Jimenez,  198?,  Chapter  5;  World  Bank,  1990,
Chapter  5).  Nor has  the  evidence  from  micro-level  anthropometric  observations
of participants  in  direct  nutrition  programs  been  anything  but  mixed;  some
assessments  (such  as Berg,  1987)  have  been  more  encouraging  than  others.  (See
the survey  by Beaton  and  Ghassemi,  1982;  also  see  World  Bank 1990,  Chapter  6).
Opportunities  for social  sector  policy  reform,  aiming  to better  reach  those  in
greatest  need,  may  be severely  constrained  by the  limited  set  of
redistributive  policy  instruments  in  many  developing  countries,  particularly
in rural  sectors. The  cost  of an effective  system  of public  support  will
depend  crucially  on those  constraints. The  detailed  issues  of policy  design
and  implementation  within  actual  administrative  capabilities  are  of the  utmost
importance  to many  of the countries  which  could  benefit  from  switching  to a
strategy  of support-led  security.
6  On  the  role  of  the  international  community
A theme  of HPA is  that  one should  not  underrate  the  scope  for  successful
domestic  public  action  in  developing  countries. Nor should  one  underrate  the
importance  of the latter  for  effective  external  action. The  moot well
intentioned  international  efforts  in famine  relief  can  easily  fail  without
29supportive  domestic  action,  or at least  a sound  understanding  of the likely
responses  of the  recipient  economy  and  polity  to those  efforts. Furthermore,
as  we saw  ln the 1984-85  famine  relief  effort  in Ethiopia  and  Sudan (ao  Dreze
and Sen  argue),  the  agent.  in effective  external  public  action  are  a  much
wider  group  of people  and  institutions  than foreign  governments  and
international  agencies. And,  their  instruments  for  action  involve  more than
aid.  They include  international  awareness,  and  advice  on what is  possible.
That  said,  it  must  be expected  that  external  development  assistance  in
its  various  forms  will  remain  important  for  both famine  relief  and longer-
term  development. A good  deal  of recent  discussion  has  focused  on food  aid
within  that set  of policy  instruments. Here,  one  of the key  questions  that is
stimulated  by the  work of Sen (1981a)  and  HPA is  the role  of increases  in
aggregate  food  availability  in,famine  relief. Given  the  potentially  dangerous
confusion  that has  sometimes  arisen  over  that  role,  some  further  comments  are
called  for  here.
Though  it is  certainly  not  an implication  of Sen (1981a)  or HPA, there
is a  belief  in  some  quarters  that an increase  in aggregate  food  availability
is  not called  for  to stop  a famine  that  was not  itself  caused  by a decline  in
aggregate  availability.  And  the  belief  seems  to have  occasionally  been  put
into  practice. For  example,  the sluggish  response  of some  aid  agencies  to
early  warnings  of the  1984-85  famine  in  Ethiopia  has  been attributed  to their
assumption  that  private  food  surpluses  in  the  country  were sufficient  to
maintain  aggregate  consumption,  in spite  of the  recent  drought. Of course,
the  aid agency's  ex ante  assessment  of aggregate  availability  is  bound  to be
imprecise  and  it now  appears  likely  that availability  was  seriously  low  in
Ethiopia  ln 1984-85. But  this is a  different  issue. The  question  here  is:
30even if aggregate domestic availability is not threatened, can there be a case
for emergency interventions aimed at increasing the supply of food to the
domestic economy in response to signs of an increase in starvation?
The case in favor of increasing aggregate food availability in response
to a famine can remain highly persuasive even if the famine was not caused by
a decline in aggregate availability.  To illustrate, consider the stylized
case of starvation arising from an adverse shift in food distribution, as a
result of which, the poor end up with a lower share of an unchanged aggregate.
In principle, the absolute consumption level. of the poor could be restored
either by restoring the previous distribution of food, or by increasing
aggregate availability.  It is not difficult to imagine situations in which
the first option is unfeasible in the (crucial)  short-run.
To give another illustration, suppose that private storage is deemed to
be excessive.  A government may deal with this by sending the police out to
bash up "hoarders", as happened, for example, during the Bangladesh famine of
1974.  This may work, but one suspects that it is  generally more effective as
a public relations exercise (aimed at promoting the view that the government
is punishing some of the culprits for the food shortage), than as a means of
increasing current food consumption.  And one must also appreciate the
importance of the government's behavior to the formation of stockholders'
price expectations.  As discussed above, the immediate goal of governments or
aid agencies in these circumstances should be to take actions that lead
stockholders to revise downwards any excessive expectations of future prices.
A believable undertaking to import food would almost certainly do this; an
unbelievable promise to bash up hoarders tay well have the opposite effect.
31However,  it should  also  be noted  that,  although  the case is  often  strong
for increasing  aggregate  food  availability  during  a famine,  this  need  not  mean
that  direct  food  delivery  is  the  beat available  form  of intervention,  from  the
point  of view  of minimizing  mortality. Under  the circumstances  discussed
earlier,  the  monetization  of food  aid,  to facilitate  cash  payments  to
potential  famine  victims,  may provide  more  effective  relief  than  the usual
policy  of importing  and  distributing  food.
7  Conclusions
1990  saw  the  publication  of a  number  of major  works  and  public
declarations  advocating  concerted  effort  to greatly  reduce  poverty  and  hunger
in  the 1990a. This  article  has focused  on one  of these  works,  "Hunger  and
Public  Action"  by Jean Dreze  and  Amartya  Sen,  though  it has  tried  to draw  out
the  contrasts  and  similarities  with  other  recent  writings,  and  the
implications  for  future  research  and  policy.
Dreze  and  Sen  argue  convincingly,  in  my view,  that there  is a  positive
role for  public  action  in  both famine  relief  and  the longer  term  alleviation
of poverty  and  hunger,  and  that it is  a  role  that  poor countries  with limited
domestic  resources  can  go along  way  toward  fulfilling.  They need  not  wait to
be rich  countries.
In arguing  the case  for  such  public  action,  particularly  in  the longer-
term,  the authors  put less  emphasis  on raising  incomes  (except  in so far  as
that  mediates  public  support)  than  one finds  in some  other  recent  writings  on
this  general  topic,  such  as the 1990  World  Develo2ment  Report  on poverty.
In  my view,  Dreze  and  Sen  are  entirely  justified  in  their  criticism  of
the  use of average  output  as the  ole  indicator  of  progress  in  development. A
32high average  Lncome  can  allow  great  scope  for  wLde-spread  well-belng,  but lt
does  not guarantee  it.  However,  one should  be careful  not  to lose  sight  of
that fact  that mean income  is  one  of the relevant  parameters  of well-being;
the  others  are  the  distributLon  of income,  and  the provLiion  of cruclal  non-
market  goods,  notably  basic  social  servlces. There  are some  notorlously
dlfficult  problems  here in finding  the right  balance  between  "growth"  and
"equity",  and  between  the  provision  of goods  by "private"  and "public"  means.
The  pooLtion  one  takes  wlll  depend  in  part  on one's  vlews  about  human  well-
being  and  soclal  welfare  at  quLte  an abstract  level.  It  wlll also  depend
cruclally  on country  speciflc  circumstances,  lncluding  past  rates  of growth,
and levels  of lncome  Lnequality  and  social  servlce  provlsion. Focusing  on the
expansion  of baelc  human  capabilitLes  can  help clarlfy  some  of these  issues,
though  I am unconvlnced  that  this  perspective  leads  one  to seriously  doubt  the
instrumental  lmportance  of  attalning  growth  wlth  equity  in  most  developlng
country  settings.
Thus  lt is  not  sufficlent  to know  that  poor countries  need  not  walte  to
be rich countrles  before  provlding  soclal  security  - one  also  needs  to know  lf
they  wlll  then need  to walte  any longer  to be rich countrles. It  cannot  be
presumed  that they  will,  though  there  is little  more  that one  can say  wlthout
knowlng  the economlc  cLrcumstances  and  policy  detalls. This  is an important
topic  for  future  research.
There  are  a  number  of  as  yet  unanswered  questions  about  the  capabilities
approach  to  definlng  the  objectives  of public  action. For  example,  since  the
approach  eschews  utillty  based  welfare  assessments,  one  mlght  find  that  the
pollcy  choice  whlch  has  the  greatest  impact  on basic  capabilltles,  such  as
health,  may be judged  to be lnferlor  to some  other  cholce  by all  affected
33individuals. One should  be wary  of a sole  reliance  on utility  information
(for  example,  in  other  work Sen  has  shown  how  utility  based  assessments  of
policy  choices  may  contradict  other  valued  principles,  such  as  liberty;  see
Sen, 1970,  Chapter  6).  That is certainly  no less  true in  discussing  matters
related  to health. But  these  arguments  fall  well short  of convincing  me that
one should  ignore  utilty  information  altogether. The best  way  to incorporate
that information  in policy  evaluation,  and  what  trade-off  is to be accepted
against  other  objectives,  remains  unclear.
"Hunger  and  Public  Action"  does offer  authoritative  encouragement  on the
M&ent&lo for  effective  public  action  against  hunger. Famines  can  be avoided,
and  we need not  wait for  an increase  in  domestic  aggregate  food  availability
to do so (though  not  denying  that  that  will  almost  certainly  help). Chronic
hunger  and  the  threat  of destitution  can  be greatly  alleviated,  and  we need
not  wait for  growth  to do the job (though  not  denying  that  the right  sort  of
growth  is a powerful  weapon,  and  that  public  action  has  a role in  promoting
that growth). While  I believe  that  a reasonably  broad  consensus  now  exists  on
these  propositions,  great  challengers  remain  in  both the  analysis  and
implementation  of effective  public  action  against  hunger  in specific  country
circumstances. There  is still  much  we do not  know  about  how  to go about
making  a success  of public  support. This should  be a high  priority  for  future
research  on development  policy.
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Endnotes
1.  Dreze and Sen (1989) is the first in a series of books reporting results
of research sponsored by the World Institute of Development Economics Research,
United Nations University.  Other volumes include Dreze and Sen (1990).
2.  Namely the "Cairo Declaration" of the World Food Council, the "Bellagio
Declaration" organized by the World Hunger Program, Brown University, and the
"Bangkok Affirmation" by the Task Force for Child Survival; these are reprinted
in the August 1990 special issue of Food Policy.  Also see the introduction to
that issue by Kasperson and Kates, 1990.
3.  This  is  widely  believed  to  generally,  tough  not  always,  reduce
undernutrition; for a survey see Pinstrup-Anderson and Hazell 1985.
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